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Balancing Access to Data And Privacy 
A review of the issues and approaches for the future1 
Julia Lane, National Science Foundation 
Claudia Schur, Social and Scientific Systems 
Abstract 
Access to sensitive micro data should be provided using remote access data 
enclaves. These enclaves should be built to facilitate the productive, high-quality 
usage of microdata. In other words, they should support a collaborative 
environment that facilitates the development and exchange of knowledge about 
data among data producers and consumers. The experience of the physical and life 
sciences has shown that it is possible to develop a research community and a 
knowledge infrastructure around both research questions and the different types of 
data necessary to answer policy questions. In sum, establishing a virtual 
organization approach would provided the research community with the ability to 
move away from individual, or artisan, science, towards the more generally 
accepted community based approach.  
Enclave should include a number of features: metadata documentation capacity so 
that knowledge about data can be shared; capacity to add data so that the data 
infrastructure can be augmented; communication capacity, such as wikis, blogs and 
discussion groups so that knowledge about the data can be deepened and incentives 
for information sharing so that a community of practice can be built. The 
opportunity to transform micro-data based research through such a organizational 
infrastructure could potentially be as far-reaching as the changes that have taken 
place in the biological and astronomical sciences. It is, however, an open research 
question how such an organization should be established: whether the approach 
should be centralized or decentralized. Similarly, it is an open research question as 
to the appropriate metrics of success, and the best incentives to put in place to 
achieve success. 
 
JEL Code: C81 - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing 
Microeconomic Data  
                                                 
1  This is drawn from a report commissioned by AcademyHealth for a conference entitled “Health Services Research in 2020: A Summit 
on the Future of HSR Data and Methods”. 
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Introduction  
The new Administration promises to focus considerable attention on basing policy decision 
on empirical evidence. Social science researchers have an unprecedented opportunity to 
respond to this national imperative by collecting and analyzing new data on human and social 
behavior. Advances in cyberinfrastructure have created a virtual deluge of new types of data 
ranging from new data on human interactions through digital imaging, sensors, and analytical 
instrumentation to new ways of collecting biological and geospatial information from survey 
respondents and to combining data from different sources, such as surveys and administrative 
records. New computational capacity has emerged that facilitates the analysis of the data in 
terms of modeling and simulation with an unprecedented breadth and depth and scale [2, 3]. 
At the same time, new instrumentation provides unprecedented opportunity for researchers to 
advance scientific understanding through collaboration with colleagues around the globe[4].  
Other disciplines have developed institutions to use the new data collection and analysis 
capacity provided by cyberinfrastructure advances to respond to similarly pressing needs with 
great success. Biotechnologists acquired the human genome sequence and used new 
technologies and analytical methods to identify variations in human DNA that underlie 
particular diseases; the development of institutional infrastructures, such as the National 
Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI), to promote access and analysis has been 
critical to this response.2 In response to the concerns with tsunamis, geoscientists advanced 
their modeling, mapping and assessment techniques by putting together a tsunami-related data 
archive3. Astronomers have developed national and international virtual data observatories of 
the sky4 to better compare and combine data from different sources. 
Despite the potential recognized and realized by other disciplines, the set of options 
available to access social science data has remained fundamentally unchanged for decades. It 
is clear that traditional responses to providing access are unlikely to be sufficient to address 
the national imperative. Current approaches admit too great a loss of data utility, and too great 
a risk to confidentiality, to provide the evidence base necessary to guide policy.  
The major reason for the current lack of options is that the data that are best suited to 
guide decision making are collected about human beings. These micro-data, or data collected 
on an individual unit of analysis, such as a person, household, or firm, are critical to 
                                                 
2  ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/dbgap 
3  http://nctr.pmel.noaa.gov/Dart/dart_home.html  
4  NVO: http://www.us-vo.org/; IVOA: http://www.ivoa.net/ 
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modelling individual behavior, and hence to studying the marginal effects of interventions. 
This is particularly true in social science research where there is great interest in investigating 
different impacts across racial or ethnic groups, or where much of the analytical interest 
results from studying a small group of individuals. It is obvious that the micro-data are 
extremely sensitive because the very information necessary to provide policy guidance has a 
privacy risk in that the information could be used to re-identify individuals.  
However, there may well be a chance for new approaches due to a confluence of a number 
of events.  
One is the increased movement to openness and transparency in government, illustrated by 
the data.gov and open.gov initiatives. The increased emphasis on evidence based policy5 and 
accountability is permeating the way in which the federal government does business, and 
should extend to statistical agencies. 
Another is due to advances in multiple scientific disciplines. In the field of information 
technology, important advances have been made in the technological aspects of cyber-
security. In statistical analysis, there is a burgeoning literature on perturbation techniques and 
synthetic datasets. Finally, our understanding of the behavioral and social factors contributing 
to data protection has increased, particularly the ways in which social, economic, 
organizational and legal factors can be combined to reduce the risk of re-identification. [5]  
This paper provides an overview of the challenges raised by concerns about data 
confidentiality in the context of social science research as well as the current environment and 
the significant issues raised by the advent of new electronic data systems and data linkage 
technologies. It describes the current methodologies used to ensure data security and privacy 
together with the impact on data analysis. It argues that the current data access modalities are 
insufficient to allow a response to the current national need for evidence-based research and 
provides an overview of successful approaches used in other contexts. It concludes by 
providing a set of policy recommendations for improving access to data for research purposes 
while giving appropriate attention to patient privacy.  
A conceptual framework for Data Access and Privacy 
The basic tension between data access and data confidentiality in the context of studying 
social science phenomena is well understood [6]. The core challenge is balancing the risk of 
                                                 
5  “Building Rigorous Evidence to Drive Policy” Orszag Blog June 8, 2009 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/blog/09/06/08/BuildingRigorousEvidencetoDrivePolicy/  
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reidentification with the utility associated with data analysis.  
The risk6 from reidentifying individuals in a microdataset is intuitively obvious. Indeed, 
one way to formally measure the reidentification risk associated with a particular file is to 
measure the likelihood that a record can be matched to a master file [7]. If the data include 
direct identifiers, like names, social security numbers, establishment id numbers, the risk is 
obviously quite high. However, even access to close identifiers, such as physical addresses 
and IP addresses can be problematic. Indeed, HIPAA regulations under The Privacy Rule of 
20037 require the removal of 18 different types of identifiers including other less obvious 
identifiers such as birth date, vehicle serial numbers, URLs, and voice prints. However, even 
seemingly innocuous information make it relatively straightforward to reidentify individuals, 
by finding a record with sufficient information that there is only one person in the relevant 
population with that set of characteristics8. In one particularly well known example, voter 
registration records, which provide information on birthdate, gender and zipcode, were 
combined with hospital discharge data to locate hospital discharge records to generate 
diagnosis, treatment, and medication information for former Massachusetts Governor William 
Weld [8]. It is worth noting that while birthdate, gender, and zipcode ares considered to be 
“de-identified data,” and are permitted to be used under a data use agreement without patient 
authorization or waiver under HIPAA [9] 87 percent of Americans could be identified based 
simply on such information [10]. Such risk of re-identification has been increasing due to the 
increased public availability of identified data and rapid advances in the technology of linking 
files.9 
There are two main types of consequences of reidentification that have been described in 
the literature - (i) financial and (ii) psychosocial. In the former category, one might think 
about the revelation of an expensive medical condition to an insurer, employer, or potential 
employer. Such disclosure might lead to denial of insurance coverage or to job loss or lack of 
job offer. These events could result in serious financial consequences. Not linked directly to 
health disclosures are the no less worrisome risks of identity theft. In terms of psychosocial 
impacts, revelation of PHI could lead to embarrassment or stigma in a social or work circle, or 
loss of reputation resulting in isolation or difficulty obtaining employment.  
                                                 
6 In the context of this analysis of health services research, we will combine the term “risk” of reidentification with the term “harm” from 
being reidentified. Although these are usually conceptually separated, the key concern associated with data access is the “risk of harm” 
7  Under the Privacy Rule, organizations that hold health care data such as health plans or providers (referred to as covered entities) are 
bound by specific rules with respect to the sharing or use of “protected health information” (PHI). While researchers are not considered 
covered entities and so are not directly bound by the rule, because much of the data traditionally used for health services research must 
be obtained by these covered entities researchers ultimately must adhere to its requirements. 
8  Statistical agencies often are even more stringent, and institute a “rule of three”, since even if there were only two individuals in a 
multidimensional cell, the self-identifying respondent could infer information about someone else’s characteristics. 
9  http://www.fcsm.gov/working-papers/charlesday.pdf 
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Access to micro-data generates utility in a number of dimensions. [5] Clearly the more 
information that is provided and the more researchers that have access to the data, the greater 
the value of the analytical work that can be undertaken. In addition, the more transparent the 
access, the more likely it is that a body of knowledge will be developed around the dataset, 
expanding knowledge about the underlying data quality, the correct uses of the data, and the 
important data gaps. Finally, data access is essential to ensuring that analytical work is 
generalizable and replicable, which is the essence of scientific endeavor.  
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of this conceptual tradeoff between data risk 
and data utility. Here the dashed line identifies the maximum tolerable risk; the core guiding 
principle should be to generate released data that are as close to the frontier as possible.10 [12] 
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Overview of the current Environment 
Types of Data, Utility and Risk 
As data capture and computing capabilities have become more sophisticated, the types of data 
used in health services research, and the ability to link data from multiple sources, has 
                                                 
10  For a good practical implementation of this approach, see 11. Duncan, G., S. KellerMcNulty, and L. Stokes, Database 
Security and Confidentiality: Examining Disclosure Risk vs. Data Utility through the R-U Confidentiality Map. 2004, National Institute 
for Statistical Sciences. 
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expanded.  
There are four main data sources or types that are generally used; the data we discuss are 
primarily those related to the patient or consumer though we touch on provider-level data 
where appropriate.  
Survey Data Perhaps the most longstanding source of data to guide policy has been survey 
data collected from individuals and households. The utility of survey data lies in its ability to 
provide detailed information on a wide variety of theoretically based questions: indeed, there 
are certain types of research questions that can only be addressed using survey data. However, 
survey data can be limited when examining specific. In-person surveys are also costly and 
telephone surveys, while less so, are increasingly subject to low response rates and, perhaps of 
more importance, can be biased due to differences in phone coverage by economic status [13].  
The risk associated with survey data lies in its strength: the rich contextual information 
that is provided. Information that is typically important for policy decisions, such as 
geography, date of birth, marital status and history, number of children, and occupation are 
sufficient to reidentify not only the respondent, but also possibly others in the household. The 
risk is ameliorated by the fact that typically a survey is drawn from a subsample of the 
population, and the smaller the proportion of the population that is sampled, the more difficult 
it is to reidentify the individual. It is for this reason that surveys can often be released as 
public use files. 
The maximum acceptable risk for federally collected survey data has, until quite recently, 
been determined by the legal mandate of the agency that collected the survey, as well as the 
Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a). In the case of the U.S. Census Bureau, the legal 
requirement was derived from its Title 13 mandate (if the data were collected using a Census 
Bureau frame) or from Title 15 (if the data were collected using a frame provided by the 
survey sponsor). BY contrast, in the case of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the data collection 
was covered by a Commissioner’s order. In 2002, however, the passage of the Confidential 
Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act of 2002 (CIPSEA), meant that statistical 
agencies collecting data under CIPSEA guidelines were formally required to take “reasonable 
means” to protect data confidentiality. However, OMB guidelines left that definition to 
agency discretion, and each agency has interpreted the term “reasonable means” differently. 
Administrative data. This category of data usually refers to data that is collected or 
compiled primarily to administer a program or provide a benefit. The utility of administrative 
data is that they offer the advantage of large numbers of observations, so that it is possible to 
get very precise estimates of certain effects, and to study small groups with statistical 
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precision. However, administrative data are not a panacea. Since they are collected for 
programmatic, rather than analytical purposes, there can be important gaps. In addition, they 
tend to have limited information on individual demographic or socio-economic 
characteristics: for example, data on race/ethnicity can often be missing, in part because it is 
not part of the data custodian’s mission-related responsibility. Because of these data 
limitations, studies assessing racial and ethnic disparities in areas of policy interest may be 
misleading. In addition, it is worth noting that administrative data are probably underutilized, 
reducing the utility of such data. Getting permission to use administrative data for purposes 
other than those for which it was collected can be an extremely time-consuming process. Each 
data custodian is responsible for fulfilling their agency’s mission, which is typically 
programmatic in nature. Allowing researcher access is usually not within their mandate, 
however important the broader social or research goal.  
The nature of disclosure risk with administrative data also lies in its strength, and as such 
is very different from that of survey data. Because the data are universal, a record that links 
uniquely is reidentified with certainty. In addition, because the program agency retains the 
administrative file, they always have the possibility of reidentifying the individual for non 
analytic purposes. For this reason, administrative records are typically not released as public 
use files, but are provided through licensing agreements or via onsite access. 
The “maximum acceptable risk” definition here also depends on the guidelines of the 
agency. Probably the most well known (and feared) are the rules governing access to IRS 
administrative records, which are governed by Title 26 of the U.S. code. IRS imposes both 
physical and statistical security requirements, as well as institutes a formal safeguards review 
which can be daunting in its level of detail. By contrast, many state agencies have limited 
oversight of the use of their administrative records. 
Linked Administrative and Survey Data Often linking administrative data to survey data 
can provide the best of both worlds (though it mitigates any advantage of the large size of 
claims data sets). In practice, survey data are often expanded by linking the data to 
administrative records, such as provider billing records, medical records, claims data, or 
employer information.[14] 
The utility of linked survey and administrative data is substantial. In addition to increasing 
the accuracy of reporting, survey data can also be linked to administrative records to expand 
the analytic time horizon; for example, a cross-sectional survey with a follow-up linkage to 
administrative data can provide a quasi-longitudinal data set. From a methodological view, 
linkage to administrative data can also help to reduce bias from survey nonresponse (Cohen, 
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2008). However, the increased risk associated with combining the rich contextual survey 
information with administrative records is substantial. Typically the only access that is 
provided is onsite. 
The maximum acceptable risk can be a major challenge to define, since typically multiple 
legal requirements cover the use of such linked data. It is often the case that it is the 
intersection, rather than the union of the different requirements that govern the definition. 
Social-Spatial data. With the increasing sophistication of technology and geographic 
information systems, the use of social-spatial data is expanding. These are usually contextual 
data describing neighborhoods or other small geographic areas. An entire literature has 
developed in spatially explicit analysis because location, pattern, and spatial structure all 
matter in understanding human behavior.  
The utility of such data is that many insights can be derived from the contextual variables 
surrounding an individual - the schools they go to, the neighborhoods they live in, the firms 
they work for, etc, and even the people they interact with. Yet there is substantial risk from 
the use of geo-codes (such as latitude-longitude coordinates) rather than addresses or political 
units. Clearly, publicly-available data based on real property records - such as lot size or 
property tax maps - can lead to re-identification of individuals. However, just as new 
administrative datasets have made it more feasible to link micro-data, so have technological 
advances such as global positioning system (GPS) instruments and satellite technology made 
it much easier to link location-specific data at the household or neighborhood level and re-
identify individual respondents.[15] Indeed, the capacity to study the inter-relationships 
among social, demographic, neighborhood, environmental, health supply and other contextual 
factors may be essential in order to advance our understanding but raises to an even greater 
level the red flags of confidentiality breaches. A recent study funded by three federal agencies 
concluded that the use of social-spatial data linked to other person-level data “has created 
significant uncertainties about the ability to protect the confidentiality promised to research 
participants” (National Research Council, 2007).  
Current Approaches: Access to Social Science data 
The following is a brief enumeration of the most common strategies currently being used to 
balance access and privacy [5]. In terms of the R-U map, the current approaches reduce utility 
and presumably reduce risk, although despite substantial concern about disclosure of personal 
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health information, it is worth noting that there are few studies or systematic discussions of 
the types and consequences of breaches within research.11 
 
Figure 2: 
 
 
 
Public use files. A large number of federally-sponsored survey data sets are now available in 
public use files to be downloaded from agency websites. These files, however, contain 
somewhat restricted versions of the survey data. Geographic information is probably the most 
frequent type of data to be omitted from public use files - public use files for CPS, SIPP and 
PUMS do not include county identifiers. The increasing amount of data on the web, combined 
with better matching software has meant that the release of public use files is increasingly less 
viable.  
More generally, the utility of this type of access is certainly questionable, given the 
amount of “sanitizing’ that occurs before release. There are two types of approaches that are 
used to reduce the risk of disclosure: reducing information and perturbing information. In the 
former case information is reduced in a public use file by deleting variables (such as 
geographic information), recoding categorical variables into larger categories, recoding 
continuous variables into categories, rounding continuous variables, using top and bottom 
code and using local suppression and enlarging geographic areas. An excellent survey of the 
                                                 
11  There is some evidence from research conducted earlier in the HIV epidemic that rural patients traveled to urban areas to seek care in 
order to avoid disclosure about their condition; however, this phenomenon was related to health care delivery rather than research 
(Schur et al,). Similarly, a typology of confidentiality was developed but applies to health care communications between patients and 
providers rather than to research (Brann and Matson, 2004). 
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techniques available to agencies is provided by Duncan et al.12 who note that considerable 
effort has gone into developing disclosure limitation methods for tabular data that effectively 
lower disclosure risk and provide products with high utility to legitimate data users. However, 
as has been documented in multiple reports, these approaches can lead to biased coefficients 
(in the case of topcoding) and reduced statistical precision (recoding). In the case of at least 
one important survey, the Survey of Income and Program Participation, the lack of date of 
birth information substantially reduced its value for studying retirement decisions (one of the 
two major rationales for funding the study) and the lack of state specific detail substantially 
reduced its value for studying welfare program participation (the other major rationale for 
funding the study).  
In the latter case, information is perturbed in a number of ways: noise addition (adding a 
random error centered on zero to the measure), record swapping, rank swapping, blanking and 
imputation, micro-aggregation and multiple imputation/modeling to generate synthetic data. 
In the case of noise addition, the resultant parameter estimates are unbiased, but the standard 
errors are too large. Thus, for example, it is more difficult to reject the null hypothesis that a 
treatment has no impact – even if, in fact, it has an impact.  
Of even greater concern is the fact that most researchers are unaware that the public use 
files have been disclosure proofed, and make inferences without understanding the caveats. 
Of course, this is partly due to the fact that despite the fact that statistical agencies publish 
extensive and high-quality documentation that informs users of the consequences of different 
sampling procedures and nonsampling errors, and how to adjust estimates accordingly, there 
is typically no discussion of the effort to achieve disclosure limitation because of concerns 
that such information would permit researchers to “back out” the disclosure limitation 
algorithms.  
It is also not clear what the impact of such statistical approaches have on risk. The 
increased capacity to find identifying information and link to the survey data means that 
researchers like Latanya Sweeney have been able to reidentify individuals in public use files.  
Research data centers. Research data centers - both on-site and remote access - provide 
access to data in a controlled physical or electronic environment. The nature of the control is 
such that the researcher can essentially have access to the full range of existing data items but 
must either submit code electronically to process the data or must physically sit in a secure 
space. Materials are subject to review before they can be removed from a data center.  
                                                 
12 George T. Duncan, Stephen E. Fienberg, Ramayya Krishnan, Rema Padman and Stephen F. Roehrig “Disclosure Limitation Methods and 
Information Loss for Tabular Data” in Confidentiality, Disclosure and Data Access: Theory and Practical Applications for Statistical 
Agencies, editors, Pat Doyle, Julia Lane, Laura Zayatz and Jules Theeuwes, North Holland, 2001. 
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The impact on data utility is substantial in terms of reducing the amount of research that 
can be done, given that utility can be defined as a function of both data quality and the 
number of researchers using the data [5]. The process used by the Census Bureau RDCs is 
particularly cumbersome and requires that the research conducted show a benefit to the 
Bureau’s programs. From submission of a final proposal to actual use of the data takes a 
minimum of 6 months. This long time horizon imposes substantial burdens on researchers, 
and lessens the usefulness of data for quick turnaround policy studies. Physically accessing 
data centers can be difficult for those not in the Washington metro area; even for those located 
nearby, temporarily re-locating can be an imposition and working in the data center makes it 
difficult to confer with colleagues or have a research assistant do the programming. In some 
cases, the researcher must pay significantly for use of the data center, usually to have data 
center staff construct analytic files that the researcher might have been able to create more 
efficiently on their own.  
Licensing arrangements or data use agreements (DUAs). Licensing is used by a variety of 
different agencies. The approach involves the agency entering into a signed agreement with 
an external researcher that permits them to access semi anonymized datafiles using a defined 
set of protocols at their home institution. The license typically includes a Data Security Plan 
that defines location, security arrangements and access protocols; confidentiality pledges; 
institutional concurrence, disclosure review, onsite security inspections and terms for 
termination.  
The impact on data utility is substantial, primarily due to the time and financial burdens on 
the researcher. The application processes for access to data range from the straightforward to 
the intrusive and cumbersome. In some cases, researchers need to justify the relevance of their 
research and submit lengthy answers to questions, despite having obtained funding support.  
General Issues 
In addition to the very specific issues identified about the current environment associated with 
data access, it is worth noting that the requirements of the Privacy Rule may inhibit other 
aspects of research. Gaining permission from individuals to gather these types of data is 
difficult, in part because of the publicity surrounding the implementation of privacy rules and 
the mis-interpretation of the requirements by providers. Researchers have reported that the 
requirements for informed consent and the explanation of risks has reduced individuals’ 
willingness to participate in research and concerns over penalties for disclosure of information 
have made organizations reluctant to make data available to researchers[16]. These changes 
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may result in fewer research studies or research studies that are less scientifically robust. 
Finally, the Privacy Rule may limit the circle of those involved in the research process. 
Without strong academic partners to facilitate the IRB process, community-based 
organizations may find it increasingly difficult to participate in research studies. 
New Types of Data and New Approaches  
The new demands for microdata access result from more than a national health care 
imperative and the new Administration’s emphasis on openness and transparency13. Social 
scientists in many areas of research recognize that new ways of collecting data mean that the 
traditionally ways of providing access are inadequate. The new types of personally 
identifiable information that are being collected by means of sensors, video imaging, texts and 
bio-markers cannot be provided by means of public use files, licensing agreements are too 
insecure and risky, and research data center access is too slow, difficult and costly to be a 
generalizable solution. Social scientists are also beginning to recognize that the advent of 
large scale shared datasets in the physical and biological sciences has transformed those 
disciplines by building scientific communities that share and communicate knowledge. 
Similar technologies offer a corresponding potential to transform social science research in 
general and health services research in particular.[2] 
New Types of Data 
The potential to use biomedical 
markers to guide social science 
research has become 
increasingly obvious. As the 
FOBIS project has noted, 
biomedical sensors can be 
developed that exploit micro 
and nanotechnology, to 
monitor body functions and 
status. These markers, together 
with development of RFID 
                                                 
13  Evidence by data.gov and open.gov 
 
Figure 1: Source - Dag Ausen Nordic Innovation[1] 
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(radio frequency identification devices) and video technologies mean that information can be 
collected in a far more granular fashion than what is available from all the data sources 
previously available, ranging from the environmental impacts on social behavior to measuring 
the number and quality of human interactions. In fact similar technologies are already being 
used for research purposes to great advantage. For example, Schunn uses video data collected 
from a recent highly successful case of science and engineering, the Mars Exploration Rover, 
to study the way in which human interactions contributed to the success of the project. While 
the project both wildly exceeded engineering requirements for the mission and produced 
many important scientific discoveries, not all days of the mission were equally successful. 
Schunn uses the video records to trace the path from the structure of different subgroups (such 
as having formal roles and diversity of knowledge in the subgroups) to the occurrence of 
different social processes (such as task 
conflict, breadth of participation, 
communication norms, and shared mental 
models) to the occurrence of different 
cognitive processes (such as analogy, 
information search, and evaluation) and 
finally to outcomes (such as new methods for 
rover control and new hypotheses regarding 
the nature of Mars).[17] Similar potential 
should exist to examine how different health 
intervention teams interact and work together 
– and the impact (or failure) of different interventions.  
Of course, human behavior is increasingly captured through transactions on the internet. 
For example, most businesses, as well as registering with the tax authority, also create a 
website. It is now entirely possible to use web-scraping technologies to capture up to date 
information on what businesses are doing, rather than relying on administrative records and 
survey information. Historical records on businesses can also be created by delving into the 
repository of webpages on the Wayback Machine (see Figure 4 for an example of the 
webpages for Citibank). This archive takes snapshots of the web every two months and stores 
them in the manner shown, providing a rich archive of hundreds of billions of web pages. 
Individual as well as business behavior can be studied using this archive. Indeed, major NSF 
Figure 2 
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grants, such as the Cornell Cybertools award14, have funded the study of social and 
information networks using these very large semi structured datasets. 
This vividly illustrates how new approaches to capturing information could transform 
social scientists’ ability to provide information to policy makers. Imagine a similar exercise 
being done in the study of health care markets, for example. Real time data collected from the 
web analysis of online blogs and newspaper articles could have picked up clusters of concern 
about different types of medicines or treatments and potentially used to describe the 
information cascades about swine flu that had such an impact in the spring of 2009.  
Of course, together with new data, new analytical techniques need to be developed. 
Standard regression analysis and tabular presentations are often inadequate representations of 
the complexity of the underlying data generation function. There are a variety of reasons for 
this inadequacy. First, the units of analysis are often amorphous – social networks rather than 
individuals, health ecosystems rather than physical health care establishments. Second, the 
structural relationships are typically highly nonlinear, with multiple feedback loops. Third, 
theory has not developed sufficiently to describe the underlying structural relationships, so 
“making sense” of the vast amounts of data is a substantive challenge. There has been 
substantial effort invested in developing new models and tools to address the challenge, 
however. For example, since a major national priority is understanding the formation and 
evolution of terrorist networks through the internet and other communication channels, 
substantial resources have been devoted to the field of visual analytics. Their research agenda 
aligns very closely with a potential research agenda for social scientists, focusing as it does on 
the science of analytical reasoning, visual representations and interaction techniques, data 
representations and transformations, as well as the production, presentation and dissemination 
of complex relationships. [18] It is also worth noting that new partnerships are being formed 
to address the nontrivial computing challenges.15 
New Approaches: Remote Access and Statistical Approaches 
Just as the new types of data could potentially transform the utility (and risk) associated with 
access to data on human beings, as indicated by the location of the “new data” element on the 
R-U map in Figure 5, new approaches to providing access have also evolved (as indicated by 
the “released data” element on the same map).  
                                                 
14  Very Large Semi-Structured Datasets for Social Science Research, NSF award 0537606 http://www.infosci.cornell.edu/SIN/cybertools 
15  http://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=111470 
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Figure 5: 
 
 
 
These include trustworthy computing: models, logics, algorithms, and theories for analyzing 
and reasoning about all aspects of trustworthiness - reliability, security, privacy, and usability. 
Protecting databases against intruders has a long history in computer science[19]. Computer 
scientists themselves are interested in protecting the confidentiality of the data on which they 
do research (for example, the Abilene Observatory supports the collection and dissemination 
of network data, such as IP addresses). Cyberinfrastructure advances have the potential to 
greatly expand the set of access modalities, particularly with respect to remote access. The 
Trustworthy Computing initiative at NSF has created a research community that focuses on 
developing network computers that are more predictable and less vulnerable to attack and 
abuse, that are developed, configured, operated, and evaluated by a well-trained workforce, 
and that educate the public in the secure and ethical operation of such computers.[O1] The 
Department of Defense has developed different levels of web-based access ranging from 
unclassified (nipr-net) to secret (sipr-net) to top-secret (jwics-net)7 using off the shelf 
technology. 
There are also scientific advances in ways to state, reason about, and resolve conflicts 
among privacy policies, and between privacy and security policies, particularly understanding 
the interplay between people and technology and the evaluation of trustworthiness. A good 
example of this is the PORTIA project which focuses on both the technical challenges of 
handling sensitive data and the policy and legal issues facing data subjects, data owners and 
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data users. Finally, the recent NSF SBE/CISE workshop on cyberinfrastructure8 outlined a 
combined computer and social science research agenda for different approaches to access. 
Remote Access 
Indeed, many national and international statistical agencies have moved towards secure 
remote access as a way to promote researcher access. These entities, often called “data 
enclaves” have a portfolio approach to protecting confidentiality. This approach combines 
statistical, technical, legal and operational controls at different levels chosen by the agencies 
to optimize the combination of confidentiality protection and data utility in their context. A 
visualization of this is provided in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: 
Utility Confidentiality
 
 
The specific approach can be implemented within a secure data enclave that researchers can 
access remotely. All access is in compliance with agency-specific and department-specific 
data sharing requirements and utilize best practices from the data sharing field as well as 
state-of-the-art information technologies and applications. The specific approach is 
implemented within a secure data enclave that researchers can access remotely. In addition, 
the enclave typically has utilities that permit data archiving, indexing and curation.  
A typical data enclave provides an information technology solution using a robust set of 
data access tools that facilitate high-quality researcher interaction with the data, while at the 
same time ensuring that data confidentiality is protected through a holistic suite of security 
and auditing measures. With the remote access mode, the data enclave provides external 
researchers with the ability to access the data in a controlled manner over the internet. Thus 
when a researcher needs to remotely access the data enclave’s online resources, he/she first 
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initiates an encrypted connection with the data enclave using virtual private network (VPN) 
technology. VPN technology enables the data enclave to prevent an outsider from reading the 
data transmitted between the researcher’s computer and the enclave’s network. Before the 
VPN connection can be completed, the user must provide a pre-defined user id and password. 
RSA Smart Card technology can also be used, so that the user must validate his/her identity in 
real time. Other components of the VPN technology allow the enclave to control which 
network resources the external researcher can access on the enclave’s network. Finally, if it 
becomes a requirement, the data enclave can also restrict the users to accessing the data 
enclave from specific, pre-defined IP addresses. So, for example, the researcher would be able 
to use the remote access tool at work, but not at home or from overseas. 
There are typically also statistical protections. Typically data enclaves protect every data 
set by constructing a set of unique identifiers that can substitute for variables that are explicit 
personal/organizational identifiers, such as name, address, phone number, Social Security 
Number and Taxpayer Identification Number. The data enclave is also able to limit 
researchers’ access to the data they need for their specific research questions if necessary. To 
accomplish this, the data enclave can create custom analytic data files that contain a subset of 
the columns (and even rows) contained in the master data set.  
The utility from such an approach is that the new cybertools could be used to provide an 
opportunity for health services researchers to develop new modes of analysis, such as virtual 
organizations that study social science data.16 The opportunity is clear from the way in which 
ubiquitous information technologies has transformed many facets of human interaction and 
organization. Tools such as the Grid, MySpace, and Second Life have changed how people 
congregate, collaborate, and communicate. Increasingly, people operate within groups that are 
distributed in space and in time that are augmented with computational agents such as 
simulations, databases, and analytic services which interact with human participants and are 
integral to the operation of the organization. 
The risk is limited because the enclave access modality relies on multiple approaches to 
reducing risk rather than one single “silver bullet”. There typically legal protections, which 
can be used to reduce the likelihood of a deliberate breach; researchers are trained and 
instilled with a culture of confidentiality, to reduce the likelihood of an inadvertent breach; 
and technical procedures are put in place, through IT technologies, to reduce the likelihood of 
                                                 
16  is a group of individuals whose members and resources may be dispersed geographically, but who function as a coherent unit through 
the use of cyberinfrastructure. A virtual organization is typically supported by, and provides shared and often real-time access to, 
centralized or distributed resources, such as community-specific tools, applications, data, and sensors, and experimental operations. 
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an external breach. Finally, organizational procedures are put in place, such as audit logs, 
trails and webcams to monitor behavior and act as a discipline device. 
Statistical Approaches 
Synthetic data 
A great deal of attention has recently been paid to the potential of using synthetic data as an 
alternative approach to releasing public use data files.[20] One approach is to shuffle data; 
another is to develop samples composed of draws from the posterior predictive distribution of 
the confidential data, given some conventionally disclosure-controlled data. The advantages 
of these approaches is that they are inference valid in that the synthetic data contain exactly 
the same statistical information as the micro data. In addition, the effect of disclosure 
protection on data quality can be measured. Finally, the multiple synthetic data implicates are 
not identical so the analyst can use the between implicate variation to measure the extent to 
which confidentiality protection made the inferences less precise. 
In practical terms, an important additional value of such inference-valid synthetic data is 
that multiple public use files can be created from the same underlying data - targeted at 
different audiences. For example, some users of business data (such as transportation 
agencies) are particularly interested in geographic detail, while others are interested in 
industry detail (such as industry analysts). Providing both levels of detail on the same data set 
immediately re-identifies important businesses. However, inference-valid synthetic data could 
be used to produce two separate data sets that can not be re-linked for such re-identification. 
An excellent layman’s summary is provided by Norman Bradburn 
… synthetic data sets which have all of the statistical properties of the original data set, but have 
entirely false data - made-up data, so that you cannot break confidentiality because, in fact, any 
data set, any data record you have is a synthetic data record. …… possibly the way of the future 
for lots of very, very confidential data, and maybe because the … the ability to protect 
confidentiality … is being eroded by the internet …this is probably where we are going to be 
driven to, although, I hope not.[21] 
The risk is reduced since the synthetic data record does not reflect the respondent’s actual data 
record, so identity disclosure is impossible. However, it is quite possible that an individual’s 
attribute could be disclosed, and with extreme values, the re-identification of a source record 
might occur.  
There is also a strong possibility for reduced utility in some cases. In particular, since the 
synthetic data approach relies on the conditioning variables to generate the released data, any 
analysis on the synthetic data will be in error if the synthesizing model is wrong – there may 
also not be analytical validity for small subgroups. Synthetic data will not be able to release 
 19
the outliers that are often critical to understanding important rare events. And synthetic data 
take a very long time to generate, since there are very few people trained to create such files. 
Finally, since it is necessary to use quite sophisticated techniques to work with synthetic data 
(working with 10 or more implicate files), the typical user may not be able to use the dataset 
correctly. 
Spatially based methods A new and parallel literature has developed using spatially based 
methods and algorithms.[22] These use Geographic Information Systems (GIS), rather than 
individuals or households as the unit of analysis but then can be used to link individuals with 
their geographic location to such measures as environmental exposures, the locations of health 
resources and the demographic characteristics of populations.[23] The same set of challenges 
arise with geospatial data as with other obviously reidentifiable measures. The use of geo-
codes (such as latitude-longitude coordinates) rather than addresses, political units can create 
risks to respondents because publicly available data based on real property records - such as 
lot size, property tax maps – can lead to re-identification. However, just as new administrative 
datasets have made it more feasible to link micro-data, so have technological advances such 
as global positioning system (GPS) instruments and satellite technology made it much easier 
to link location-specific data at the household or neighborhood level and re-identify individual 
respondents[15].  
It is quite striking that the approaches that have been used to protect confidentiality at the 
geo-spatial level mimic those that have been used to protect micro-data. In particular, 
researchers rely on geographical aggregation and removal of spatial context to protect 
confidentiality, but have similarly serious concerns about the impact of these measures on 
data quality[15]Other protection approaches, such as data masking are, mean that locations 
are “offset” by a parameter that moves the geo-coded location off the centerline to a 
“plausible” (approx) location on the correct side of the street or “squeezed” by a compression 
factor that moves locations inward on block face to ensure they are on correct street. 
Similarly, inverse address matching approaches to measure the degree of re-identification risk 
are very similar to record linking approaches.[24]  
A core ethical question is raised in the use of the data: the expanding use of spatial 
technologies in combination with communication technologies via location based services 
(LBS), poses a particular challenge to increase beneficial uses and grow the industry, while 
protecting users. The core assumption of the LBS industry is that corporations and industry 
will own and control location and related information about individuals, individual choice 
limited to “opt-in” or “opt-out” of our services and boilerplate conditions [25] and leads to 
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very different technical challenges and research questions than those that will be addressed by 
the market place. In particular, there is a very strong case to be made for research into the 
public goods aspect of protecting privacy - particularly development of a legal/ethical code of 
conduct. An excellent review piece, providing a summary of institutional and technical 
approaches to ensuring confidentiality, the techniques employed by various agencies and a set 
of recommendations. [24] 
Recommendations 
The Administration’s focus on evidence based policy means that new approaches must be 
taken to improve the utility derived from current and existing data, while at the same time 
protecting confidentiality. The evidence produced in this paper provides the basis for the 
following recommendations. 
 
1. Access should be provided to data using remote access data enclaves. These enclaves 
should be built to facilitate the productive, high-quality usage of microdata, and 
should support the most useful elements of traditional, hands-on data analysis 
collaborative environment.17 The goal of the enclaves, drawing on the experience on 
the physical and life sciences, should be to develop a research community and a 
knowledge infrastructure around both research questions and the different types of 
data necessary to answer policy questions. In sum, establishing a virtual organization 
approach would provided the health services research community with the ability to 
move away from individual, or artisan, science, towards the more generally accepted 
community based approach adopted by the physical and biological sciences. It would 
provide the community with a chance to combine knowledge about data (through 
metadata documentation), augment the data infrastructure (through adding data), 
deepen knowledge (through wikis, blogs and discussion groups) and build a 
community of practice (through information sharing). This opportunity to transform 
health services research through such a organizational infrastructure could potentially 
be as far-reaching as the changes that have taken place in the biological and 
astronomical sciences. It is, however, an open research question for the health services 
data community as to how such an organization should be established: whether the 
approach should be centralized (like the UK’s JISC) or decentralized (like the U.S. 
                                                 
17  See, for example, Building Effective Virtual Organizations http://www.ci.uchicago.edu/events/VirtOrg2008/VO_report.pdf 
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National Science Foundation approach). Similarly, it is an open research question as to 
the appropriate metrics of success, and the best incentives to put in place to achieve 
success. However a recent solicitation18 as well as the highlighting of the importance 
of the topic in NSF’s vision statement,19 suggests that there is substantial opportunity 
for health service researchers to investigate the research issues. 
 
2. Delays associated with access to data for research should be reduced. These delays act 
to reduce both data utility and do not reduce the risk associated with data access. Often 
research has been funded and review of usefulness is redundant; these reviews serve to 
prolong the approval process and discourage use of data, but do not lead to enhanced 
protection. This is particularly true for the information-based research which is the 
focus of this paper, rather than interventional clinical research - the former uses 
existing data, records, or specimens, with no direct patient treatment. As noted by the 
Institute of Medicine Committee on Health Research, the current rules do not 
distinguish “between the unique needs of information-based research and 
interventional clinical research, which involves people who participate in experimental 
treatment. Applying the same protections in these two fundamentally different 
scenarios is neither appropriate nor justifiable.”[26]  
 
3. A broad body of knowledge should be built about the availability of existing 
technologies for data access. Standards should be promulgated that facilitate use of 
best practices in protection of personally identifiable information including standards 
for data security, so that each data provider does not have to “reinvent the wheel”. 
Beyond this, we should rely on legal sanctions for anyone who intentionally tries to re-
identify or disclose information.  
                                                 
18  www.nsf.gov/pubs/2008/nsf08550/nsf08550.htm 
19  NSF Cyberinfrastructure Vision for 21st Century Discovery, March 2007 
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